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Abstract
The post-World War II period has seen substantial changes in labor productivity around
the world. Motivated by these changes, this article documents four facts about the world
productivity distribution. First, there is a large and increasing disparity between the tails.
Second, this disparity rapidly increased in the mid-1980s, slowed down in the next decade,
and stabilized in the mid-2000s. Third, overtime, there has been substantial forward and
backward mobility of countries and regions. Fourth, the upper tail of the distribution is
more sensitive to improvements in human capital, while the lower tail is more sensitive to
improvements in efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Both convergence and divergence in output per worker characterize the post-World War II pe-
riod. The world productivity distribution shows a noticeable divergence at the bottom, and
convergence and overtaking at the top. For example, average labor productivity in Taiwan rela-
tive to that in the United States rose from 13 percent in 1960 to 78 percent in 2010. Conversely,
in the same period of time, labor productivity in Venezuela dropped from 60 percent to 25
percent.
In line with the work of Abramovitz (1986), Parente and Prescott (1993), and Duarte and
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Restuccia (2006), this article updates and expands the set of facts that theories of development
should explain. Using data on potential GDP per worker, this article highlights three facts
about disparity and mobility of the world productivity distribution between 1960 and 2010. In
addition, two simple forecast exercises, following the work of Jones (1997a, b) and Quah (1993,
1996), suggest potential scenarios where convergence in labor productivity seems more plausible.
The first fact highlights large cross section disparities in labor productivity since 1960. For
example, in 1960 an average worker in ten most productive countries of the sample produced
about 40 times more output than the average worker in the ten least productive countries.
Also, the shape of the world productivity distribution in 1960 appears unimodal and largely
concentrated at the bottom—50 percent of the sampled countries show a relative output per
worker no greater than 17 percent relative to that in United States.
The second fact points to the speed at which the disparity in labor productivity has been
evolving. After more than two decades of relative stability, productivity disparities across coun-
tries rapidly increased in the mid-1980s. In the next decade, however, the speed of this diver-
gence slowed down; particularly since mid-2000s, the data suggest a small tendency towards
convergence.
These two facts consistently update and extend the previous literature. Parente and Prescott
(1993) report stable differences in labor productivity across countries for the coverage period
ending in 1985. Duarte and Restuccia (2006) not only verify this stability, but also —after
extending the coverage period until 1996— document a rapidly increasing dispersion. In this
context, this article not only updates the disparity facts until 2010, but also provides some
initial evidence on the stabilization of the productivity differences due to improvements in poor
countries.
The third fact documents substantial forward and backward mobility of countries and even
regions within world productivity distribution. For example, labor productivity in Asia relative
to that in the United States rose from 15 percent in 1960 to 37 percent in 2010. In contrast,
labor productivity in Latin America declined from 28 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 2010.
Overall, these forward and backward mobility patterns seem consistent with the polarization of
the world productivity distribution and the “twin-peaks” hypothesis suggested by Quah (1993,
1996).
Given the previous facts, a natural question emerges: how might the world productivity
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distribution look in the future? Analysis based on an aggregate production function provides
some insights answer this questions. Jones (1997a) emphasizes that potential differences in
output per worker can be attributed to current differences in population growth rates, physical
investment rates, human capital stocks, and technology levels (TFP). Building on this approach,
countries above the 75th percentile are expected to increase their convergence rate and even
overtake the technological leader. Less developed countries, however, might remain very close
to, or even fall behind, their 2010 labor productivity levels. The results also emphasize the role
of total factor productivity (TFP) as the key driver of this convergence and divergence process.
An alternative yet complementary framework to forecast the world productivity distribution
(over a more distant time horizon) uses Markov methods. This is an approach taken by Quah
(1993, 1996) and Jones (1997b) among others. Based on historical mobility frequencies, the
results suggest that labor productivity might still be characterized by a bimodal distribution,
with a small yet significant number of countries at the bottom.
Overall, this article contributes to the earlier literature in three ways. First, it adds the
period between 1996 and 2010 to the analysis. Second, it characterizes disparity, mobility, and
the steady-state distribution of labor productivity using trended data to abstract from business-
cycle fluctuations. Third, it presents a comprehensive view (past, current, and future) of the
evolution of labor productivity for a large sample of countries.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the main disparity and mobility facts.
Section 3 describes how the world productivity distribution might look in the near future using
a neoclassical production function approach. Assuming a more distant time horizon, Sections
4 describes the world productivity distribution using Markov methods. Section 7 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Disparity and Mobility Facts
This section characterizes the cross-section dynamics of labor productivity around the world
using a balanced sample of 92 countries for the period 1960-2010.1 To build upon and extend
previous findings, the organization and presentation of facts follows the work of Duarte and
Restuccia (2006)
1See Appendix A for a description about the construction of the sample.
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2.1 Large and Increasing Disparities
One of the main motivating facts in the field of economic growth and development is the large
and increasing disparity in output per worker across countries. This subsection presents the
behavior of disparity indicators between 1960 and 2010. Focusing first on the top and bottom
of the world productivity distribution, Figure 1 illustrates the labor productivity gap between
the ten most productive and ten least productive countries for each year since 1960 until 2010.
Over this period, the productive gap between the tails of the distribution varied from 39 to 68
times. By 2010 the average worker in the ten most productive countries produced 67.6 times
more output than the average worker in the least productive group of countries. Historically, the
first decade of the new millennium records the largest disparity between the tails of distribution
in the post-World War II period.
Figure 1: Output per Worker—Ratio of the Ten Most Productive to the Ten Least Productive
Countries
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Source: Author's calculations using data from PWT 7.1
Output per Worker- Ratio of Ten Richest to Ten Poorest Countries
Notes: Between 1960 and 2010, the following countries comprised the ten most productive group with the highest
frequency (i.e., 51 years): Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, United States. The following countries
comprised the ten least productive group with the highest frequency (i.e., 51 years): Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe.
Consistent with earlier findings in the literature, Figure 1 suggests that the disparity between
the tails of the distribution has been roughly constant during the first two decades of the sample
period. Since the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s, however, there has been a rapid increase in
the productivity gap between the top and bottom of the distribution.2The first line drawn at
2As noted by Sala-i-Martin (2006), increasing differences in average income per capita or average output per
worker at the country level may not imply higher income inequality, or any other welfare measure, at the world
level, since global inequality is also a function of within country inequality. In addition, worldwide improvements
in life expectancy and other health measures are not directly captured in standard productivity and income
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1985 represents the ending period of the first strand of the previous literature, which emphasizes
constant disparities between the tails of the distribution. That literature includes the work of
Parente and Prescott (1993), and Chari et al. (1997). The second line drawn at 1995 represents
the second strand of the earlier literature, which emphasizes rather increasing disparities. That
literature inclues the work of Duarte and Restuccia (2006)
Extending the findings of the earlier literature, Figure 1 also documents that since the mid-
1990s this increasing productivity disparity has slowed down. Moreover, after 2006 the gap has
stabilized and shifted its tendency. Evaluating more extensible the nature of this trend, Figure
2 suggests that the recent stabilization of the productivity gap is driven by improvements at the
bottom of the distribution.
Figure 2: Relative Output per Worker-Ten Most Productive and Ten Least Productive Countries
(1960=100)
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Relative Output per Worker- Ten Richest and Ten Poorest (1960=100)
Notes: Average output per worker relative to that in the U.S. for the ten most productive and least productive
countries. Both series are normalized to 100 in 1960. As reference, in 1960 the average relative output per
worker of the ten most productive countries is 85.88 percent, while for the ten least productive countries, it is
2.20 percent.
Figure 2 reports the average labor productivity relative to that in the United States for the
ten most productive and least productive groups, each normalized to 100 in 1960. Overall, this
figure shows that the increase in the disparity between the tails of the distribution is mostly
driven by the decline in productivity in the least productive productive countries. For example,
from 1977 to 2006, relative productivity decreased by 42 percent. Since 2006, however, the ten
poorest countries have grown even faster than the ten richest countries. This positive growth
statistics, yet they help reducing income, welfare, and productivity differences in the world (Becker et al., 2005;
Weil, 2007; Jones and Klenow, 2010).
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Table 1: Relative Output per Worker by Percentile
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Percentile: (percent)
P10 3.6 3.1 3.0 2.4 2.1 2.0
P20 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.5 2.9 3.8
P30 6.3 6.2 7.4 5.9 5.3 6.1
P40 8.2 10.1 10.7 10.2 8.3 9.6
P50 15.8 16.6 22.5 18.5 15.6 17.2
P60 23.1 25.5 27.9 25.2 23.1 25.9
P70 33.1 38.0 44.3 39.8 33.7 33.9
P80 47.5 63.4 72.6 74.2 74.4 78.0
P90 64.2 76.4 88.3 85.9 86.3 83.1
Ratio:
P90/P10 18.0 24.9 29.2 35.9 41.8 41.0
P80/P20 10.0 14.2 16.4 21.1 25.3 20.5
episode ends up a 30-year period of productivity divergence.
Moving beyond the analysis of the tails of world productivity distribution, Table 1 reports
the relative labor productivity for a selected number of percentiles and years. The last two rows
report the ratio of the ninetieth percentile to the tenth percentile and the ratio of the eightieth
percentile to the twentieth percentile.
In 1960, the least productive countries of the tenth percentile showed an average productiv-
ity of 3.6 percent relative to that in the United States. In the same year, the most productive
percentile percentile achieved 64.2 percent of the productivity in the United States. This differ-
ence yields a ratio of 18 between the highest and lowest percentile. Note that both percentile
ratios increased substantially until the year 2000, but then they started decreasing. Moreover,
all other percentiles showed improvements in the last decade. This global coververgence episode
occurred after more than two decades of productivity divergence in all percentile groups.3
When considering the entire distribution, our sample seems consistent with the “twin peaks”
hypothesis (Quah (1993a,b), Quah (1996), Jones (1997)). Using gaussian kernel densities at
different points in time, Figure 3 shows the movement in the mass of countries from the middle
to both right and left of the distribution. This polarization of the distribution characterizes the
third fact on the cross-sectional dynamics of labor productivity is evaluated at the country and
regional levels in the next subsection.
3From a geographical perspective, only Asian economies improved their relative productivity in the 1980s and
1990s, though at a slower pace compared to other decades.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Relative Output per Worker
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World Productivity Distribution
2.2 Substantial Mobility within the Distribution
Table 2 reports a mobility matrix based on the frequency of country movements over a period
of 51 years. Based on their relative productivity in 1960 and 2010, the first column and the row
classify countries into seven intervals. The variable y˜ indicates a country’s labor productivity
relativity to that in the United States. The labels for each interval are somewhat arbitrary
cutoffs for low (L), upper low (UL), lower-middle (LM), middle (M), upper-middle (UM), lower-
high (LH), and high (H) productivity levels. For example, the first element of this matrix, 0.86,
indicates that out of all the low-productivity countries (L) in 1960, only 14 percent of those
countries upgraded their status to an upper-low productivity country (UL) by the year 2010.
Table 2: Mobility Matrix 1960-2010
L2010 UL2010 LM2010 M2010 UM2010 LH2010 H2010
(y˜ < 2.5)L1960 0.86 0.14 0 0 0 0 0
(2.5 ≤ y˜ < 5)UL1960 0.27 0.40 0.07 0.27 0 0 0
(5 ≤ y˜ < 10)LM1960 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.12 0.06 0 0
(10 ≤ y˜ < 20)M1960 0 0 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.21 0
(20 ≤ y˜ < 40)UM1960 0 0 0.06 0.22 0.44 0.17 0.11
(40 ≤ y˜ < 80)LH1960 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.27 0.6
(y˜ > 80)H1960 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.67
Values in the off-diagonal elements of the matrix indicate the mobility frequencies of coun-
tries. The distribution shows a higher degree of mobility in the middle compared to the ex-
tremes. Among all the middle-productivity countries, most improvements occurred for the
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high-productivity countries in this subset. For example, out of all lower-middle (LM) produc-
tivity countries in 1960, 35 percent of those countries remained in the same productivity interval,
while 47 percent moved backward and 18 percent moved forward after 51 years. In contrast, out
of all upper-middle (UM) productivity countries in 1960, 44 percent of those countries remained
in the same productivity interval, while and 28 percent moved backwards and 28 percent moved
forward after 51 years. Overall, these results reiterate the story of Figure 3: the post-war period
is characterized by both convergence and divergence patterns (that is, countries moving from
the middle to both right and left of the labor productivity distribution).
Figure 4 also characterizes the mobility within the distribution by comparing the level of
relative productivity for each country in 1960 and 2010. The solid 45-degree line represents
countries in which productivity relative to that in the United States has not changed from 1960
to 2010. Countries above (below) the solid 45-degree line improved (deteriorated) their position
relative to the technological frontier. The dashed lines indicate the median relative productivity
for each year.
Figure 4: Relative Output per Worker- 1960 vs 2010
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Figure 4 is useful for identifying large convergence and divergence experiences. Countries
with the largest productivity improvements include Taiwan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong,
and Romania. In contrast, countries with the largest productivity deterioration include the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Central African Republic, Nicaragua, and Madagascar.
Another approach to continuously characterize mobility reports the level of relative produc-
tivity for every year since 1960 to 2010. Figure 4 summarizes this information from a regional
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perspective for Latin America, Asia and Africa.4 Among these cases, the most noticeable pat-
tern points to contrasting performance of Latin America and Asia. Although regional averages
tend to mask interesting exceptions,5 Figure 5 is still informative in suggesting that the bulk of
diverging countries are primarily located in Latin America and Africa.
Figure 5: Relative Output per Worker by Developing Regions
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Relative Ouput per Worker by Region
So far this section has presented a set of facts about the increasing disparity and mobility
within the world productivity distribution. These facts, naturally, lead to the question: what
will the distribution of labor productivity look like in the future? The following two sections
aim to answer this important question based on the characterization of a steady-state (long-run)
equilibrium in both a determinist and a stochastic setting.
3 Labor Productivity in the Long Run
This section uses economic theory to deterministically estimate the long-run (steady-state) dis-
tribution of labor productivity. Briefly, the following subsection describes the model suggested
by Jones (1997a), which is a variation of the standard neoclassical growth model. Within this
framework, long-run labor productivity depends on the current equipment, skills, and technology
available to workers. After introducing the model, the following subsections empirically describe
the variables, parameters, which will be used in the computation of a steady-state distribution
4This regional classification is based on the macro geographical classification of the United Nations. See
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm for details.
5These exceptions are identifiable from Figure 4.
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of output per worker for a sample of 85 countries.6
3.1 Model
Consider the following economy:
Y (t) = K(t)α (A(t)H(t))
1−α
, (1)
H(t) = eφS(t)L(t), (2)
k˙(t) = sK(t)y(t)− (n(t) + δ)k(t), (3)
where Y is total output, which is produced by physical capital K, human capital H, and labor-
augmenting total factor productivity A. Human capital or skilled labor is produced by raw labor
L, the time devoted to skill accumulation S , and the rate of return to a year of education φ.
Letting lower case letters represent variables in per worker terms, the accumulation of physical
capital per worker k depends on the investment rate sK , the population growth n, and the
depreciation rate δ.
To solve for a balanced growth path, all the variables should grow at constant rates. Then,
in equilibrium, the growth rate of output per worker and the growth rate of capital per worker
should be equal to the growth rate of total factor productivity, which is denoted as gA. By
construction of the model, the exogenous variables are the growth rate of technology, gA, the
physical capital investment rate, sK , the human capital investment rate,S, and the population
growth rate, n.
Given the previous settings, the value of output per worker along a balanced growth path is
specified as follows:
y(t) =
(
sK
n+ gA + δ
) α
1−α
hA(t). (4)
Note that along this equilibrium state, all economies growth at the same exogenous rate, gA,
but the levels of technology. A, are not necessarily the same across countries. Finally, redefining
per-worker variables relative to those of the United States we have
y˜(t) = ξ˜
α
1−α
K h˜A˜(t), (5)
6Due to the lack of systematic educational data, this section is based on a smaller 85-country sample. This
sample, however, is still larger (in terms of the number of countries and time periods) than that used in Jones
(1997).
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where y˜ ≡ y(t)yUS(t) , ξ˜K ≡
ξK
ξKUS
, h˜ ≡ hhUS , A˜ ≡
A(t)
AUS(t)
, and ξK ≡ sKn+gA+δ . Equation 5 summarizes
the most important prediction of the model: in a proximate sense,7 the steady-state distribution
of relative output per worker is a function of (1) the investment rate in physical capital, sK ,
(2) the investment rate in human capital accumulation, S, (3) the population growth rate, n,
and (4) the level of technology, A. Finally, as noted by Jones (1997a), other more fundamental
factors such as political instability, macroeconomic policy, taxes and subsidies, social conflict,
corruption and so on must work through one or more of these four proximate channels.
3.2 Determinants of the Steady State
Parameters
To calculate Equation 5 we need data on the parameters related to the shape of the production
function: α, φ, and gA + δ. By construction, those parameters are assumed to be constant
across countries and their calibration is based on standard estimates of the growth literature
(See Table 3).
Table 3: Calibration of Parameters
Parameter Calibration Source
α 13 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
φ 0.10 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994)
gA + δ 0.075 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
Variables
Equation 5 also requires variation across countries for sK , n, S, and A˜. Last decade averages for
the physical investment rate, sK , and population growth rate, n, are computed from the Penn
World Tables version 7.1. Data on average years of schooling, S, for the year 2010, are taken
from Barro and Lee (2010). Finally, to estimate the relative level of technology A˜ in 2010, the
paper follows “development accounting” decomposition suggested by Jones (1997a).
Figure 6 shows the behavior of three of four determinants of labor productivity (the con-
struction of the relative level of technology is discussed in the next paragraph). Note that the
rate of investment in physical capital sK appears to be converging across regions. With the
exception of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, global convergence in population growth n is also
7See Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu (2009) for a discussion of the relationship between proximate and
fundamental causes in economic performance.
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Figure 6: Regional Averages for sK , n, and S
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Notes: A smooth trend, based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter, is used to depict the behavior of physical
investment rates. Equal weights for each country are used in the computation of regional averages. The
regional definitions are from Barro and Lee (2010)
observable. In terms of educational attainment, although there are noticeable improvements in
all regions, there still exists a large gap between advanced and developing economies.
The relative level of total factor productivity (TFP) is the last determinant we need to fore-
cast the distribution of labor productivity. Table 4 summarizes the calculation of this variable
for a selected sample of countries.8 The overall finding of this exercise is that for the whole 85-
country sample, the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of technology (log A˜) is about
80 percent of the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of output per worker (log y˜). This
finding favors the predominant role of total factor productivity (TFP) in the determination of
output per worker. Among the particular cases, it is worth noticing that although Japan shows
the same capital-labor ratio as the United States, output per worker is about 31 percent less
than because of lower TFP. In contrast, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom report higher TFP
levels than the United States, but output per worker is lower mainly due to inferior educational
attainment. Performance in developing countries lags far behind in all these variables, yet the
major determinant of output per worker seems clearly TFP.
8Appendix B documents the relative TFP levels for the complete 85-country sample
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Table 4: Relative TFP levels (A˜) in 2010
Contributions
log y˜ α log k˜ (1− α) log h˜ (1− α) log A˜
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hong Kong -0.14 0.03 -0.18 0.01
United Kingdom -0.20 -0.15 -0.24 0.20
Japan -0.31 0.00 -0.10 -0.21
Venezuela -1.40 -0.38 -0.40 -0.62
Brazil -1.67 -0.53 -0.37 -0.78
China -1.88 -0.65 -0.33 -0.91
India -2.28 -0.81 -0.53 -0.94
Cameroon -2.98 -1.03 -0.46 -1.49
Mean (85 countries) -1.80 -0.61 -0.35 -0.84
Standard Deviation 1.37 0.51 0.18 0.73
3.3 The Steady-State Distribution and Alternative Scenarios
Figures 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the main empirical results of this section. They describe the steady-
state distribution of labor productivity under different assumptions. Also, Appendix B presents
further information for every country in the sample.
Base Model
To predict the steady-state output per worker, I use decade averages for the investment rate sK
and population n growth; also I assume the relative levels of TFP and human capital from 2010
to be constant in the near future. Given this setting, two results are worth noting.
First, consistent with the previous findings of the literature (Jones1997a), the steady-state
distribution of labor productivity appears very similar to the 2010 distribution, particularly
for the poorer 70 percent of the sample. The R2 statistic comparing labor productivity in
2010 and in steady state equals 0.99. Also, the standard deviation raises from 34 percent to 35
percent and the median decreases from 19 percent to 17 percent. Overall, these statistics suggest
that if todays’ policies regarding human capital accumulation and technological progress remain
invariant (in relative terms across countries), divergence in labor productivity —and income—
is expected to continue in the future.
Second, although the 2010 and steady-state distribution look broadly similar, they also
exhibit some interesting differences in terms of additional convergence (divergence) cases. For
example, countries which are expected to have the largest improvement in labor productivity in
the near future include China, India, South Korea, Romania, and Taiwan. In contrast, countries
13
Figure 7: Cumulative World Productivity Distributions
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which are expected to have the largest deterioration include the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Togo, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, and Central African Republic.
Inputs Convergence: The Power of Human Capital is at the Top
In this scenario, I equalize the physical investment rate sK , and years of schooling S of all
countries to that in the United States. The results of this experiment are somewhat mixed.
Figure 8 (panel a) shows that almost all countries9 improve their position (they lay above the
45-degree line) after allowing for full convergence in inputs. Further analysis reveals that human
capital is the main driver when shifting the distribution. Also the largest effect of human capital
convergence is concentrated at the top of the distribution. The median labor productivity raises
from 19 percent in 2010 to 31 percent; and the upper middle and top10 of the distribution
show the largest improvements. The downside of this scenario, however, is an increase in the
disparity of labor productivity. The standard deviation of relative output per worker raises from
34 percent in 2010 to 40 percent in steady state.
Evaluating the shape of the cumulative distribution in steady state, Figure 7 points to a
9Only Australia deteriorates its 2010 position.
10In this scenario nine countries overtake the United States and join Singapore and Norway as new technological
leaders. The new overtakers include the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Italy, France,
Denmark, Netherlands, and Hong Kong.
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potential explanation for understanding the unsatisfactory results of input convergence. Pro-
ductivity at the bottom of the distribution appears very sticky in spite of additional accumulation
of productive factors (inputs). Other countries, at the middle and top of the distribution, get
better returns with similar endowment levels. This results suggests that it is not only the low
level of inputs what keeps productivity stagnant in the poorest countries, but also the way in
which inputs are used. In the next scenario, I empirically test this well known argument of the
economic growth literature.
Figure 8: Output per Worker- 2010 vs Predicted Steady State
ARG
AUS
AUT
BDI
BEL
BENBGD
BOL
BRA
CAF
CAN
CH2
CHE
CHL
CIV
CMR
COG
COL
CRI
DNK
DOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ESP
FINFRA
GBR
GHA
GR
GTM
HKG
HND
HTI
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
KEN
KOR
LKA
MAR
MEX
MLI
MOZ
MRT
MWI
MYS
NGA
NIC
LD
NOR
NPL
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PNG
PRT
PRY
ROM
RWA SEN
SGP
SLV
SWE
SYR
TGO
THA
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
URY
USA
VENZAF
ZAR
ZMB
ZWE
0.19
0.31
.02
.04
.08
.16
.32
.64
1.28
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 S
te
ad
y-
St
at
e 
Va
lu
e 
(In
pu
t C
on
ve
rge
nc
e)
.01 .02 .04 .08 .16 .32 .64 1.28
Relative Ouput per Worker (U.S.=1 in 2010)
(a)
ARG
AUS
AUT
BDI
BEL
BEN
BGD
BOL
BRA
CAF
CAN
CH2 CHECHL
CIV
CMR
COG
COL
C I
DNK
DOM
DZA
ECU
EGY
ESPFINFRAGBR
GHA
GRC
GTM
HKG
HND
HTI
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISRITA
JAM
JPN
KEN
KOR
LKA
MAR
MEX
MLI
MOZ
MRTMWI
MYS
NGA
NIC
LD
NOR
NPL
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PNG
PRT
PRY
ROM
RWA
SEN
SGP
SLV
SWE
SYRTGO
THA
TUR
TWN
TZA
UGA
URY
USA
VEN
ZAF
ZAR
ZMB
ZWE
0.19
0.58
(b)
.01
.02
.04
.08
.16
.32
.64
1.28
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 S
te
ad
y-
St
at
e 
Va
lu
e 
(T
FP
) C
on
ve
rge
nc
e
.01 .02 .04 .08 .16 .32 .64 1.28
Relative Ouput per Worker (U.S.=1 in 2010)
15
Technology (TPF) Convergence: The Main Determinant of Development
In this scenario, I allow countries with less than the United States TFP level converge to this
benchmark, and the twelve countries with higher TFP maintain their technological advantage.
Results in this setting are more encouraging, TFP convergence both condenses and shifts
the steady-state distribution. Contrary to input convergence, the standard deviation of relative
labor productivity falls from 34 percent in 2010 to 25 percent in steady state. Almost all
countries lay above the 45-degree line11 —all developing countries move forward within the
steady state distribution— and the median raises from 34 percent to 62 percent. The overall
magnitude of this improvement appears more clearly in Figure 7. TFP convergence shifts the
entire cumulative distribution with larger effects on countries at the bottom 70 percent of the
distribution. This result is consistent with the growth and development accounting literature
in the sense that TFP differences are at least as important as capital accumulation differences.
Particularly for this exercise, the effect of TFP convergence on the median country about two
times the effect of input convergence.
There are also interesting changes at the top of the distribution. South Korea, Australia,
and Japan are expected to overtake the United States. The intuition behind the Korean and
Japanese case both countries currently have low TFP levels (among industrialized nations) and
high physical and human capital stocks. This low TFP level argument, however, might appear
puzzling if we consider these countries as current technological leaders in many areas. One
interpretation raises from the recent literature on resource misallocation.12 The main insight
of this literature suggests that TFP does not only captures technological development, but also
aggregate efficiency losses due to distortions in inputs and goods markets. To support this
argument, Baily and Solow (2001) suggests that burdensome regulation might be keeping TFP
low in Japan.
Figure 9 summarizes the different shapes of the world productivity distribution for 1960,
2010, and the three forecasted scenarios. Note that overtime the bimodal distribution persist
even under input convergence or TFP convergence. The twin-peaks hypothesis and convergence
clubs argument appear in the literature as potential explanations for this phenomenon. In the
next section, I use the basic tools of this literature to evaluate the probability of persistence of
these two peaks.
11The exceptions are Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy
12See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) for a survey reference.
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Figure 9: World Productivity Distributions
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4 Labor Productivity in the Very Long Run
Motivated by the mobility and polarization of countries within the world income distribution,
Quah (1993a,b) and Jones (1997) use Markov methods to study the evolution of the world
income distribution in a distant time horizon13. This section applies similar methods in the
context of the 2010 productivity distribution.
Essentially Markov methods compute the evolution of a system based on initial states and
transition probabilities. Mathematically, this process is described by
dtM
s = dt+s, (6)
where the vector dt corresponds to the productivity distribution in the year t, the transition
matrixM contains mobility frequencies from sample data and s represents the number of years
into the future.
The first set of columns in Table 2 reports the world productivity distribution, for the years
1960, 1985, and 2010, based on the same seven productivity intervals (states) defined in Table
2. Using Equation 6 for s = 25, s = 50, and s → ∞, we can compute estimates of the very
long-run productivity distribution.
13In somewhat more technical jargon, to asymptotically evaluate the evolution of the world income distribution.
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Table 5: World Productivity Distribution-Using Markov Chains
Predicted
States Interval 1960 1985 2010 2035 2060 Steady State
L [0, 0.025) 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.12
UL [0.025, 0.05) 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04
LM [0.05, 0.10) 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.03
M [0.10, 0.20) 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05
UM [0.20, 0.40) 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.08
LH [0.40, 0.80) 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.23
H [0.80, 1.2) 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.40 0.43 0.45
Before going over the results let us recall the differences and complementarities between the
deterministic approach used in Section 3 and the stochastic approach of this section. First,
in the previous section, I computed the near-future steady state towards which each country
seems to be headed. This section, however, focuses both on a more distant time horizon and
seven broad productivity intervals (states). Second, in the previous section, there were not
policy changes (recall that relative TFP and human capital are constant in the baseline model
SS). This section, however, by the stochastic nature of the Markov process, explicitly recognizes
policy changes, which in turn, might shift the position of a country’s steady state.
Section 3 ended with an open question: are the twin peaks of the world productivity dis-
tribution persistent? Results from Table 5 suggest that the answer of this question has two
folds.
First, even in a more distant future (i.e., the steady-state vector of a Markov chain), labor
productivity might be characterized by a bimodal distribution. Second, although the world
productivity distribution appears to be bimodal, the two peaks are far from being twins: con-
vergence dominates the process in the long run. Consider the following example: in 1960 only
7 percent of countries reported a productive level higher than 80 percent; in the long run, how-
ever, almost 50 percent of countries are expected to report a productivity level higher than 80
percent.
When contrasting these results with the early findings of Jones (1997b), the main differences
arise at the bottom of the distribution. Jones’ analysis defines the lowest interval between 0
and 5 percent and finds continuous convergence in relative income since 1988. The steady-state
fraction of countries in this lowest interval is 8 percent— a reduction of 7 percentage points
compared to the fraction of countries in the same interval in 1960. This article, however, defines
a narrower interval, between 0 and 2.5 percent, and it initially finds continuos divergence from
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1960 to 2035 (continuous convergence emerges thereafter). The steady-state fraction of countries
in this lowest interval is 12 percent— an increase of 4 percentage points compared to the fraction
of countries in the same interval in 1960 (8 percent).
Table 5 also shows that in the long run (steady-state) distribution there is a positive prob-
ability of any country spending some time in any interval. The interpretation of this result is
that, as the time horizon increases asymptotically, any country might experience a large policy
disaster or reform. To illustrate this point, Jones (1997) highlights Japan’s reforms, in post
world war II period, as a noticeable example of a country moving to the very top of the produc-
tivity distribution. In contrast, there is the famous example of Argentina, one of the richest and
most productive countries in the world in the early part of the twentieth century that drastically
moved backward within the productivity distribution. Other similar examples, described in the
introduction of this article include Hong Kong and Venezuela.
Finally, using the transition matrix of Table 2 we can conduct further experiments based on
the conditional distribution of labor productivity. For instance, consider the situation of a low
productivity country (i.e., y˜ > 80 percent in 2010) and a high productivity country (i.e., y˜ < 10
percent in 2010). Intuitively, the former has more changes to remain poor, while the latter has
more chances to remain rich in the near future.14 This intuition is consistent with the empirical
results reported in the Appendix A. These results predict that, by 2035, a low productivity
country has a 45-percent probability to remain poor. In turn, a high productivity country has
a 50-percent probability to remain rich.15 Both distributions, however, asymptotically converge
to the world productivity distribution reported in Table 5.
5 Concluding Remarks
The world productivity distribution in the post-World War II period is characterized by four
remarkable facts: (1) a large and increasing disparity between the tails of the distribution; (2)
this disparity rapidly increased in the mid-1980s, slowed down in the next decade, and stabilized
in the mid-2000s; (3) overtime, there has been substantial forward and backward mobility of
countries and regions within the distribution; and (4) the upper tail of the distribution is more
sensitive to improvements in human capital, while the lower tail is more sensitive to improve-
14This is one of the results of Section 3.
15To compute the predicted distribution in each case, the initial distribution is d(2010)=[1,0,0,0,0,0,0] for a
low productivity country and d(2010)=[0,0,0,0,0,0,1] for a high productivity country.
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ments in efficiency. Overall, the dynamic nature of these facts not only present a challenge to
the existing theories of development, but also provide opportunities for the development of new
theories and policy initiatives.
Disparities in labor productivity across countries are large, but disparities in technology
(broadly defined) are even larger. Improvements in aggregate efficiency in developing coun-
tries might drastically affect the distribution of labor productivity and accelerate the process
of convergence. If current institutions and policies remain in place, however, the world produc-
tivity distribution might be characterized by additional divergence at the bottom, and further
convergence and overtaking at the top.
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A Labor Productivity in the Very Long Run: Three Alter-
native Cases
Table 6: The Case of a Low Productivity Country:
State Interval 2035 2060 SteadyState
L [0, 0.025) 0.30 0.17 0.12
UL [0.025, 0.05) 0.10 0.06 0.04
LM [0.05, 0.10) 0.05 0.04 0.03
M [0.10, 0.20) 0.07 0.05 0.05
UM [0.20, 0.40) 0.07 0.07 0.08
LH [0.40, 0.80) 0.15 0.21 0.23
H [0.80, 1.2) 0.27 0.39 0.45
Table 7: The Case of a Middle Productivity Country:
State Interval 2035 2060 SteadyState
L [0, 0.025) 0.16 0.13 0.12
UL [0.025, 0.05) 0.06 0.05 0.04
LM [0.05, 0.10) 0.03 0.03 0.03
M [0.10, 0.20) 0.05 0.05 0.05
UM [0.20, 0.40) 0.07 0.08 0.08
LH [0.40, 0.80) 0.22 0.23 0.23
H [0.80, 1.2) 0.41 0.44 0.45
Table 8: The Case of a High Productivity Country
State Interval 2035 2060 SteadyState
L [0, 0.025) 0.07 0.11 0.12
UL [0.025, 0.05) 0.03 0.04 0.04
LM [0.05, 0.10) 0.03 0.03 0.03
M [0.10, 0.20) 0.04 0.04 0.05
UM [0.20, 0.40) 0.08 0.08 0.08
LH [0.40, 0.80) 0.26 0.24 0.23
H [0.80, 1.2) 0.50 0.46 0.45
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B Data:
This article uses data from Penn World Tables V7.1 (see Heston, Summers, and Aten 1991) to
construct annual time series of PPP-adjusted GDP per worker in chained 2005 prices (variable
RGDPWOK). Following the criteria of Duarte and Restuccia (2006), the selection of countries
was based on the following criteria:
1. Countries that have data for every year from 1960 to 2010
2. Countries that have at least one million in population in 2010.
These restrictions rendered a set of 92 countries. Adding data on educational attainment,
which comes from Barro and Lee (2010), the final data set contains complete information for 85
countries.
For every output observation, business-cycle fluctuations are removed using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 100. For the most part of the article,
data series on output per worker are reported relative to that of the United States. It is the
conventional view in the literature that the United States is a stable technological benchmark
against which to measure potential gains in labor productivity in all countries. As a reference, in
the post-war period, potential labor productivity in the United States grew at roughly 2 percent
per year. .
The capital stock is calculated by summing investments from 1960 to 2010 using a deprecia-
tion rate of 6 percent and an initial capital stock determined by the steady-state capital-output
ratio of 1960. Given the 51 years of the capital series and the selected depreciation rate, the
calculated values of the capital stock are quite insensitive to the initial value.
Determinants Relative Output per Worker
Countries sK n S2010 A2010 1960 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Steady-State Prediction
Algeria(DZA) 0.33 0.01 7.63 0.30 0.35 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.69
Argentina(ARG) 0.20 0.01 9.42 0.46 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.43 0.65
Australia(AUS) 0.30 0.01 12.12 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.94 1.04 1.03
Austria(AUT) 0.24 0.00 9.52 1.23 0.56 0.92 0.94 1.30 0.94 1.34 0.94
Bangladesh(BGD) 0.21 0.02 5.91 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.46
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Determinants Relative Output per Worker
Countries sK n S2010 A2010 1960 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Belgium(BEL) 0.26 0.00 10.62 1.13 0.64 0.96 0.99 1.19 0.99 1.27 0.99
Benin(BEN) 0.19 0.03 4.35 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.34
Bolivia(BOL) 0.11 0.02 9.87 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.47
Brazil(BRA) 0.21 0.01 7.55 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.17 0.29 0.54
Burundi(BDI) 0.12 0.04 3.35 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.24
Cameroon(CMR) 0.16 0.02 6.21 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.39
Canada(CAN) 0.24 0.01 12.08 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.92 0.93
Cent. African Rep(CAF) 0.08 0.02 3.68 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.21
Chile(CHL) 0.26 0.01 10.17 0.44 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.46 0.80
China(CH2) 0.35 0.01 8.11 0.26 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.78
Colombia(COL) 0.20 0.01 7.75 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.31 0.18 0.30 0.54
Congo Dem. Rep.(ZAR) 0.17 0.03 3.26 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.29
Congo Republic (COG) 0.23 0.03 6.30 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.46
Costa Rica(CRI) 0.24 0.02 8.74 0.44 0.39 0.29 0.28 0.43 0.28 0.44 0.64
Cote d’Ivoire(CIV) 0.06 0.02 4.60 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.21
Denmark(DNK) 0.25 0.00 9.97 1.05 0.65 0.79 0.83 1.09 0.83 1.13 0.83
Dominican Rep(DOM) 0.20 0.02 7.33 0.56 0.19 0.27 0.29 0.54 0.31 0.51 0.51
Ecuador(ECU) 0.25 0.02 8.18 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.14 0.22 0.62
Egypt(EGY) 0.16 0.02 6.97 0.39 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.43
El Salvador(SLV) 0.16 0.00 7.88 0.35 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.21 0.30 0.52
Finland(FIN) 0.25 0.00 9.96 1.07 0.47 0.81 0.87 1.12 0.87 1.18 0.87
France(FRA) 0.22 0.01 10.53 1.06 0.60 0.83 0.83 1.09 0.84 1.07 0.83
Ghana(GHA) 0.20 0.02 7.26 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.49
Greece(GRC) 0.26 0.00 10.68 0.88 0.33 0.73 0.77 0.93 0.77 0.98 0.88
Guatemala(GTM) 0.19 0.02 4.90 0.44 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.38
Haiti(HTI) 0.12 0.01 5.13 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.32
Honduras(HND) 0.27 0.02 7.30 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.57
Hong Kong (HKG) 0.31 0.01 10.40 1.01 0.23 0.87 0.93 1.03 0.93 1.21 0.93
India(IND) 0.28 0.02 5.20 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.12 0.26 0.49
25
Determinants Relative Output per Worker
Countries sK n S2010 A2010 1960 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indonesia(IDN) 0.20 0.01 5.95 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.45
Iran(IRN) 0.27 0.01 8.64 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.70
Ireland(IRL) 0.26 0.02 11.62 1.00 0.46 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.88 1.02 0.88
Israel(ISR) 0.23 0.02 11.36 0.83 0.54 0.74 0.67 0.78 0.67 0.79 0.81
Italy(ITA) 0.26 0.00 9.46 1.07 0.51 0.83 0.82 1.11 0.82 1.18 0.82
Jamaica(JAM) 0.26 0.01 9.75 0.27 0.40 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.77
Japan(JPN) 0.27 0.00 11.59 0.73 0.30 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.85 1.00
Kenya(KEN) 0.16 0.03 6.65 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.40
Korea Rep.(KOR) 0.36 0.00 11.94 0.62 0.13 0.63 0.72 0.64 0.72 0.81 1.17
Malawi(MWI) 0.30 0.03 4.69 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.45
Malaysia(MYS) 0.27 0.02 10.16 0.42 0.11 0.34 0.32 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.76
Mali(MLI) 0.19 0.03 2.38 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.29
Mauritania(MRT) 0.30 0.03 4.51 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.16 0.45
Mexico(MEX) 0.23 0.01 9.06 0.46 0.48 0.34 0.30 0.45 0.30 0.45 0.66
Morocco(MAR) 0.37 0.01 5.01 0.22 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.28 0.56
Mozambique(MOZ) 0.17 0.02 1.81 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.26
Nepal(NPL) 0.25 0.02 4.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.41
Netherlands(NLD) 0.21 0.01 11.02 1.04 0.88 0.86 0.84 1.07 0.87 1.03 0.84
New Zealand(NZL) 0.21 0.01 12.68 0.66 1.00 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.93
Nicaragua(NIC) 0.29 0.01 6.66 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.58
Niger(NGA) 0.08 0.02 1.84 0.33 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.18
Norway(NOR) 0.25 0.00 12.26 1.17 0.79 1.16 1.18 1.21 1.18 1.28 1.18
Pakistan(PAK) 0.15 0.02 5.53 0.19 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.37
Panama(PAN) 0.23 0.02 9.60 0.41 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.69
Papua(PNG) 0.17 0.02 4.08 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.33
Paraguay(PRY) 0.15 0.02 8.51 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.50
Peru(PER) 0.23 0.01 8.93 0.24 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.65
Philippines(PHL) 0.20 0.02 8.95 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.58
Portugal(PRT) 0.28 0.00 8.03 0.66 0.27 0.45 0.46 0.68 0.46 0.76 0.70
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Determinants Relative Output per Worker
Countries sK n S2010 A2010 1960 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Romania(ROM) 0.22 0.00 10.34 0.36 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.38 0.81
Rwanda(RWA) 0.13 0.03 3.96 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.27
Senegal(SEN) 0.25 0.03 5.20 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.44
Singapore(SGP) 0.30 0.02 9.13 1.57 0.32 1.17 1.18 1.52 1.18 1.76 1.18
South Africa(ZAF) 0.22 0.01 8.48 0.38 0.36 0.24 0.23 0.38 0.24 0.37 0.62
Spain(ESP) 0.29 0.01 10.40 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.64 0.74 0.64 0.84 0.85
Sri Lanka(LKA) 0.24 0.01 11.10 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.83
Sweden(SWE) 0.18 0.00 11.48 1.07 0.76 0.83 0.86 1.13 0.96 1.01 0.86
Switzerland(CHE) 0.25 0.00 9.92 0.94 1.03 0.78 0.74 0.97 0.74 1.02 0.79
Syrian (SYR) 0.16 0.03 5.21 0.45 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.41 0.18 0.34 0.34
Taiwan(TWN) 0.24 0.00 11.34 0.96 0.13 0.78 0.86 0.99 0.86 1.03 0.90
Tanzania(TZA) 0.23 0.02 5.78 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.45
Thailand(THA) 0.28 0.01 7.41 0.27 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.30 0.64
Togo(TGO) 0.15 0.03 5.77 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.35
Turkey(TUR) 0.18 0.01 7.18 0.91 0.16 0.40 0.44 0.88 0.49 0.79 0.49
Uganda(UGA) 0.14 0.03 5.46 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.33
United Kingdom(GBR) 0.18 0.01 9.44 1.34 0.60 0.82 0.86 1.38 0.96 1.23 0.86
United States(USA) 0.23 0.01 13.09 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Uruguay(URY) 0.21 0.00 8.56 0.42 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.43 0.65
Venezuela.(VEN) 0.21 0.01 7.13 0.39 0.60 0.25 0.20 0.38 0.21 0.36 0.51
Zambia(ZMB) 0.21 0.03 6.68 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.47
Zimbabwe(ZWE) 0.04 0.00 7.70 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.25
Notes: The determinants of steady-state output are: sK investment share, last decade average, trended
data; n population growth, decade average; S2010 average years of schooling in 2010; and A2010 relative level of
technology (TFP) in 2010. Simulations: (1) Base Model, (2) sKi = sKUSA and hi = hUSA, (3) sKi ≥ sKUSA ,
(4) hi = hUSA, (5) Ai ≥ AUSA. Data on output per worker is also available for the following countries: Burkina
Faso(BFA), Ethiopia(ETH), Guinea(GIN), Madagascar(MDG), Niger(NER), Puerto Rico(PRI), Chad(TCD).
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This countries, however, are not including in Section 2 of this paper due to lack of data on educational attainment
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